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Securities Fraud: The Reliance
Element in Initial Offerings of
Securities
I. Introduction
In 1942, the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) promul-
gated rule lOb-5' pursuant to section 10(b) of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934.2 Rule lOb-5 does not explicitly authorize a
private cause of action to investors alleging fraudulent securities ac-
tivities. Nonetheless, federal courts recognized a private remedy
under the rule shortly after its inception. a Explicit recognition by the
United States Supreme Court of a private cause of action occurred
much later.4
The elements of a private action under rule lOb-5 derive from
the common-law tort of deceit5 although some courts have not rig-
1. 17 C.F.R. § 240. lOb-5 (1981). The rule was promulgated in SEC Securities Exchange
Act Release No. 3230 (May 21, 1942). The rule provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any na-
tional securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances
under which they were made not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase of any
security.
2. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976). The section provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of any facility of any na-
tional securities exchange--
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and
regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the pub-
lic interest or for the protection of investors.
3. Osborne v. Mallory, 86 F. Supp. 869 (S.D.N.Y. 1949); Speed v. Transamerica Corp.,
71 F. Supp. 457 (D. Del. 1947); Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa.
1946).
4. Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971) (citing 6
L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 3869-73 (Supp. 1969); 3 L. Loss, SEcuRITrrIs REGULATION
1763 (2d ed. 1961)).
5. For a discussion of the relationship between rule lOb-5 and common law fraud, see
Note, The Nature and Scope of the Reliance Requirement in Private Actions Under SEC Rule
10b-5, 24 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 363, 366 (1973).
To maintain an action for deceit at common law, a plaintiff must establish:
idly restricted themselves to the common-law elements in fashioning
remedies.6 The common-law background has generally required
that plaintiffs prove reliance7 as an element of a civil action;8 how-
ever, the parameters of the reliance requirement are not uniform.
Rather, the requirement varies depending upon the nature of the de-
fendant's fraudulent action and the nature of the transaction.'
As a general rule, federal courts require a plaintiff bringing an
action under rule lOb-5 to prove reliance when the allegations con-
cern damages sustained as a result of his misrepresentations.' 0 A
different standard applies when the defendant's failures to disclose
or his misrepresentations affect the price of securities traded in the
open market. In these latter situations, courts presume the plaintiff's
reliance on the defendant's fraudulent activity and permit the de-
fendant an opportunity to rebut the presumption.I
Recently, however, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals permitted
a plaintiff to recover under rule lOb-5 in a case alleging misrepresen-
tations contained in an offering circular,' 2 without requiring proof of
(1) A false representation made by the defendant. In the ordinary case, this
representation must be one of fact.
(2) Knowledge or belief on the part of the defendant that the representation is
false-or, what is regarded as equivalent, that he has not a sufficient basis of informa-
tion to make it. This element is frequently labeled "scienter."
(3) An intention to induce the plaintiff to act or to refrain from action in reliance
upon the misrepresentation.
(4) Justifiable reliance upon the representation on the part of the plaintiff, in
taking action or refraining from it.
(5) Damage to the plaintiff, resulting from such reliance.
W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 105, at 685-86 (4th ed. 1971).
6. See Note, The Nature and Scope of the Reliance Requirement in Private Actions Under
SEC Rule 10b-, supra note 5, at 367.
7. Courts frequently utilize the term transaction causation as a substitute for the term
reliance. Transaction causation simply means that the plaintiff must show that the alleged
misrepresentations or omissions caused the plaintiff to engage in the transaction in question.
Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Co., 507 F.2d 374, 380 (2d Cir.) cert. denied, 421 U.S. 976
(1975). See also Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228, 238-40
(2d Cir. 1974); Seiffer v. Topsy's Int'l, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 653, 666 (D. Kan. 1980); Jezarian v.
Csapo, [1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97692 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 12, 1980); 1
A. BROMBERG & L. LOWENFELS, SECURITIES FRAUD & COMMODITIES FRAUD, § 4.7(551), at
86 (Supp. 1973); Note, Causation and Liability in Private-Actionsfor Proxy Violations, 80 YALE
L.J. 107, 123-24 (1970).
8. 6 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 3876 (Supp. 1969). The case most often cited for
the proposition that reliance is an element in rule lOb-5 civil actions is List v. Fashion Park,
Inc., 340 F.2d 457 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811 (1965).
9. See R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, SECURITIES REGULATION 1063 (4th ed. 1977).
10. Vervaecke v. Chiles, Heider & Co., Inc., 578 F.2d 713, 716 (8th Cir. 1978); Chelsea
Assocs. v. Rapanos, 527 F.2d 1266, 1271 (6th Cir. 1975); Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp.,
507 F.2d 374, 380 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 976 (1975); Issen v. GSC Enterprises, 508 F.
Supp. 1278, 1287 (N.D. Ill. 1981). See also Comment, The Future ofthe Reliance Requirement
in Private Actions Under SEC Rule Ob-5: A Proposal, 9 CUM. L. REV. 721, 730 (1979); Note,
The Reliance Requirement in Private Actions Under SEC Rule Ob-, 88 HARV. L. REV. 584, 589
(1975).
I1. See notes 37-75 and accompanying text infra.
12. An offering circular provides financial data, in part, to the public to provide assist-
ance in gathering data on a security exempted from the formal registration requirements of the
federal securities laws. Thus, in many respects the offering circular resembles the document
reliance on the misrepresentations. 3 The plaintiff avoided summary
judgment even though the defendant established that the plaintiff
had not read the offering documents. This holding, while creating a
conflict among the circuit courts on this issue, constitutes a novel
approach to the reliance requirement when affirmative misrepresen-
tations occur in the sale of securities not previously traded in the
open market."4
This comment analyzes the reliance concept in the context of
affirmative misrepresentations in original distributions of securities.
The focus is to ascertain whether plaintiffs who allege misrepresenta-
tion in an initial offering should be required to prove reliance on a
particular misrepresentation, or whether the presumption now pro-
vided to plaintiffs in nondisclosure and market fraud cases should be
extended. The analysis includes examination of the evolution of the
reliance concept in rule 1Ob-5 actions,'" the legislative history of sec-
tion 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,16 the interpreta-
tion of section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 by federal courts,'7 and various
policy considerations.'I
II. Conflict Among the Circuits on the Need to Establish
Reliance upon Alleged Misrepresentations
4. Shores v. Sklar 9
In Shores v. Sklar,2 ° plaintiff brought an action under rule 1Ob-5
on behalf on purchasers of industrial development revenue bonds
issued by a small city in Alabama. Bond proceeds were used to
finance construction of an industrial facility to be occupied by a
manufacturer. The manufacturer defaulted on the rent payments
and the value of the bonds plummeted. Plaintiff sought recovery
against a number of persons connected with the bond issue, includ-
ing the manufacturer, the bond counsel, the underwriters, and the
bank trustee.2'
utilized for the sale of registered securities, the prospectus. 3A H. BLOOMENTHAL, SECURITIES
AND FEDERAL CORPORATE LAW § 5.12[21, at 5-51 (1978).
13. Shores v. Sklar, 647 F.2d 462 (5th Cir. 1981) (en banc), petition for cert. filed, 50
U.S.L.W. 3474 (U.S. Nov. 2, 1981) (No. 81-839). The Shores court was sharply divided (12-
10), with a vehement dissent.
14. See notes 19-35 and accompanying text infra.
15. See notes 37-75 and accompanying text infra.
16. See notes 76-78 and accompanying text infra.
17. See notes 79-144 and accompanying text infra.
18. See notes 145-179 and accompanying text infra.
19. 647 F.2d 462 (5th Cir. 1981) (en banc),petitionfor cert.fled, 50 U.S.L.W. 3474 (U.S.
Nov. 2, 1981) (No. 81-839).
20. Id
21. For the position that investors should be denied an implied right of action under the
federal securities laws for fraudulent practices arising out of the purchase or sale of municipal
securities, see Schwartz, Municipal Bonds & The Securities Laws.- Do Investors Have an Implied
Private Remedy 7 SEC. REG. L.J. 119 (1979). The author argues that investors in municipal
The district court, after twice permitting plaintiff to amend his
complaint, granted summary judgment for defendants on the ground
that discovery demonstrated plaintiff's lack of reliance on the offer-
ing circular.22 The Court of Appeals of the Fifth Circuit reversed,
concluding that the trial judge had erred by construing plaintiffs
claim as being narrowly confined to misrepresentations or omissions
under rule lOb-5(2). 2 a Instead, the court held that plaintiff's com-
plaint alleged a broader scheme to defraud. Since the offering circu-
lar was "only one step"'24 in this scheme, the court found that
plaintiff's lack of reliance on the offering circular was not
determinative.25
The court noted that the securities laws permit an investor to
rely on "the integrity of the market to the extent that the securities it
offers to him for purchase are entitled to be in the market place."26
Therefore, plaintiff could establish the requisite element of causation
if he proved that "the scheme was intended to and did bring the
Bonds onto the market fraudulently and [that] he relied on the integ-
rity of the offerings of the securities market."27 In this manner,
plaintiff could recover under rule lOb-5 despite his failure "to read
or even to seek to read the Offering Circular."2
B. Vervaecke v. Chiles, Heider & Co., Inc. 29
In Vervaecke v. Chiles, Heider & Co., Inc.,3" plaintiff had
purchased eight corporate bonds authorized by a state-created au-
thority and issued to finance hospital construction. Plaintiff brought
an action under section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 when the value of the
bonds should be confined to damage actions under state Blue Sky statutes. A Blue Sky statute
is the common name for state securities acts. Id
22. 647 F.2d at 468.
23. The court conceded that plaintiff's claim under lOb-5(2) could not withstand his ad-
mitted lack of reliance on the offering circular. Nevertheless, the court permitted plaintiff to
proceed under lOb-5(l) and lOb-5(3). To recover, plaintiff was required to show the following:
(1) the defendants had conspired to bring securities onto the market that were not entitled to
be on the market; (2) plaintiff reasonably relied on the market as an indicator of the bonds'
genuineness; and (3) plaintiff suffered a loss as a result of the scheme to defraud. Id at 468-
70.
24. Id at 468.
25. Id at 469.
26. Id at 471. The court would only permit recovery if plaintiff could prove that the
securities would never have been marketed but for the fraud. Thus, if plaintiff proved no more
than that the bonds would have been offered at a lower price or at a higher rate, rather than
that they never would have been issued or marketed, plaintiff could not recover. Id at 470.
This standard presents an inconsistency in allowing recovery when plaintiff can prove that the
security should not have been marketed but for the fraud, while denying recovery when plain-
tiff can only prove that the security should have been offered at a drastically lower price.
Often the difference between the two situations is slight. Moreover, proof problems inhere in
attempts to show that a security should never have been offered on the market.
27. Id at 469.
28. Id at 468.
29. 578 F.2d 713 (8th Cir. 1978).
30. Id
bonds declined.3" The Court of Appeals of the Eighth Circuit af-
firmed the summary judgment granted defendants because plaintiff
could not present a factual issue regarding his reliance on the offer-
ing documents. 2 Plaintiff could only allege that "he read the offer-
ing statement when he began to learn that there might be a problem
with the bonds, but he had no specific recollection of reading it
before that."33 Thus, without expressing any opinions about which
factors induced the plaintiff to purchase, the court found that plain-
tiff had not established any causation between the alleged fraud and
plaintiff's resulting loss. 4
C Summary
Shores v. Sklar and Vervaecke v. Chiles, Heider & Co., Inc. illus-
trate cases having similar factual situations but vastly different re-
sults. Both cases concerned an initial offering of securities with
alleged misrepresentations. Both trial courts also barred plaintiffs'
claims under rule lOb-5(2) because plaintiffs failed to allege suffi-
cient facts to prove reliance on the offering documents. Upon ap-
peal, the Fifth Circuit, unlike the Eighth Circuit, viewed the
complaint broadly and provided plaintiff the opportunity to recover
under rule lOb-5(l) and (3), notwithstanding plaintiff's failure to rely
on the offering documents. Permitting plaintiff to rely on the integ-
rity of the market in a 1 Ob-5 action, rather than on the actual misrep-
resentations in initial offering materials,3" constitutes a change from
the reliance concept as currently developed. 36  Because of this
change, the Fifth Circuit's approach to the fraud on the market the-
ory of causation deserves close scrutiny.
31. As in Shores v. Sklar, 647 F.2d 462 (5th Cir. 1981) (en banc),petitionfor cert.fled 50
U.S.L.W. 3474 (U.S. Nov. 2, 1981) (No. 81-839), plaintiff joined every party connected with
the bond issue--the accountant or bond counsel, the underwriters, and the bank chosen to act
as trustee for the bond proceeds.
32. The district court had concluded that plaintiff "did not even see the offering state-
ments until after the commitment to purchase the securities had been made. Clearly, plaintiff's
determination was influenced primarily by factors personal to him and unrelated to the alleged
misrepresentations and omissions." 578 F.2d at 719.
33. Id at 718. The court resisted plaintiffs attempt to apply the reliance rule utilized in
situations of nondisclosures to this situation that alleged "material misrepresentations, and
omissions in the nature of misrepresentations, in two specific documents .... "' d at 719.
34. Id
35. But see Jezarian v. Csapo, [1980 Transfer BinderI FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97692
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 12, 1980). In Jezarian, plaintiff brought a rule lOb-5 action, alleging that an
offering prospectus for preferred stock contained misrepresentations. Discovery materials es-
tablished that plaintiff did not examine the prospectus, but rather relied on the advice of his
broker in making the purchase. Plaintiff then attempted to amend the complaint in order to
state a fraud on the market theory of causation, similar to that recognized in Shores v. Sklar,
thereby establishing a presumption of reliance and avoiding the necessity of proving reliance.
The court rejected the attempt to amend because deposition testimony indicated that the bro-
ker's advice, not the prospectus, caused the decision to purchase; therefore, even assuming that
a presumption of reliance could have been raised under a market fraud theory, this evidence
effectively rebutted the presumption. Id
36. See Note, Securities, 12 TEx. TECH. L. REv. 319, 344 (1981).
III. Evolution of the Reliance Concept in lOb-5 Actions
A. Nondisclosure Cases
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that requiring
the plaintiff in securities fraud litigation to prove reliance often
amounts to an unreasonable burden. For example, in Affiliated Ute
Citizens v. United States,37 a group of American Indians had formed
a corporation to manage assets derived from tribal holdings. The
corporation designated a local bank to act as transfer agent and re-
quested that the bank stress the importance of retaining the stock,
since the value of the shares was difficult to ascertain. Two bank
employees, however, helped shareholders dispose of shares. Certain
Indian shareholders brought an action under section 10(b) and rule
lOb-5 because the bank employees had failed to inform the sellers of
higher prices available in a resale market. The Supreme Court, in
reversing the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals,3" held that
[u]nder the circumstances of this case, involving primarily a fail-
ure to disclose, positive proof of reliance is not a prerequisite to
recovery. All that is necessary is that the facts withheld be mate-
rial in the sense that a reasonable investor might have considered
them important in the making of this decision .... This obliga-
tion to disclose and this withholding of a material fact establish
the requisite element of causation in fact.39
Lower federal courts have interpreted Affiliated Ute to mean
that, in cases involving nondisclosure, proof of the alleged nondis-
closure's materiality can be substituted for proof of reliance.4" Affili-
ated Ute and its progeny, however, do not abolish the reliance
requirement in cases of nondisclosure,4' but merely permit a pre-
37. 406 U.S. 128 (1972).
38. The court of appeals had held that no actionable violation of the rule occurred "un-
less the record disclosed evidence of reliance on material fact misrepresentations" by the bank
employees. Id at 152. The Supreme Court considered this view of rule lOb-5 overly restric-
tive: "To be sure, the second subparagraph of the rule specifies the making of an untrue state-
ment of a material fact. The first and third subparagraphs are not so restricted." Id at 152-53.
For a discussion of the Supreme Court's treatment of reliance in Affiliated Ue, see Comment,
Affliated Ute Citizens v. United States-The Supreme Court Speaks on Rule 10b-5, 1973 UTAH
L. REV. 119, 131.
39. 406 U.S. at 153-54.
40. See, e.g., Ross v. A.H. Robins Co., 607 F.2d 545, 553 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446
U.S. 946 (1980); Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 906 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
816 (1976); Issen v. GSC Enterprises, 508 F. Supp. 1278, 1287 (N.D. Ill. 1981); Seiffer v.
Topsy's Int'l, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 653 (D. Kan. 1980); but see Allen Organ Co. v. North Am.
Rockwell Corp., 363 F. Supp. 1117 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (the materiality of misrepresentations estab-
lishes causation). One court has held that proof of a misrepresentation or a nondisclosure,
without more, effectively establishes causation under Affiliated Ute. Carras v. Burns, 516 F.2d
251, 257 (4th Cir. 1975).
41. Completely discarding the concept of reliance in favor of materiality would be anom-
alous because the two elements prove different aspects of plaintiff's case. Materiality deter-
mines whether a reasonable man would have attached significance to the undisclosed or
misrepresented information while reliance focuses on whether the fraudulent activity influ-
enced the particular plaintiff to act differently. JAcoBs, THE IMPACT OF RULE 10B-5 § 64-01,
sumption of reliance.42
A presumption of reliance in nondisclosure cases is necessary
because requiring proof of reliance would present unreasonable evi-
dentiary problems: 43 Plaintiffs would be required to prove reliance
on a statement that did not exist. For this reason, "reliance has little
if any rational role" in cases involving nondisclosure.44 Moreover,
an element of probability supports the construction of this presump-
tion. Judges have generally recognized presumptions because proof
of one fact renders proof of a second fact so probable that it is sensi-
ble and time-saving to assume the truth of the second fact until the
adversary can disprove it.45 Thus, in nondisclosure cases, proof of
the materiality of the nondisclosed fact and proof of damage make it
prudent to assume the fact of plaintifis reliance.
Although presumptions provide a valuable advantage to plain-
tiffs in nondisclosure cases, the defendant may defeat plaintiffs
claim by rebutting the presumption-in other words, by disproving
reliance. As stated by the Court of Appeals of the Third Circuit in
Rochez Bros. v. Rhoades,"
We do not read [jffiliated Ute] to say that the issue of reliance e?
non may not be considered at all in a nondisclosure case, but only
that proof of reliance is not required for recovery. If defendant is
able to prove that there was clearly no reliance. . . then the non-
disclosure cannot be said to have caused the subsequent loss and
under ordinary principles of the law of fraud, recovery should be
denied.47
Defendants can rebut the presumption of reliance by proving that
the investor's decision would not have been affected even if the omit-
ted fact had been disclosed.48 One court has also stated that the pre-
at 3-153 (1974); see also Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean, 640 F.2d 534, 548 (5th Cir. 1981);
Chelsea v. Rapanos, 527 F.2d 1266, 1271 (6th Cir. 1975); Comment, Recent Developments in
Securities Law. Causes of Action Under Rule lob-5, 26 BUFFALO L. REV. 505, 523 (1977).
42. Ross v. A.H. Robins Co., Inc., 607 F.2d 545, 553 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S.
946 (1980); Vervaecke v. Chiles, Heider & Co., Inc., 578 F.2d 713, 716-18 (8th Cir. 1978);
Rifkin v. Crow, 574 F.2d 256, 262 (5th Cir. 1978); Issen v. GSC Enterprises, Inc., 508 F. Supp.
1278, 1287 (N.D. Ill. 1981).
43. Wilson v. Comtech Telecommunications Corp., 648 F.2d 88, 92 n.6 (2d Cir. 1981);
Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean, 640 F.2d 534, 548 (5th Cir. 1981); Titan Group. Inc. v.
Faggen, 513 F.2d 234, 238 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 840 (1975). In re Commonwealth
Oil/Tesoro Petroleum Securities Litigation, 484 F. Sup. 253, 260 (W.D. Tex. 1979).
44. 3 A. BROMBERG & L. LOWENFELS, SECURITIES FRAUD AND COMMODITIES FRAUD
§ 8.6 at 209 (1967).
45. C. McCoRMICK, McCoRMIcK's HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 343
(Cleary ed. 1972).
46. 491 F.2d 402 (3d Cir. 1974) cert. denied, 425 U.S. 993 (1976).
47. Id at 410.
48. Id See also Rifkin v. Crow, 574 F.2d 256, 262 (5th Cir. 1981); Clark v. Cameron-
Brown Co., 72 F.R.D. 48, 58 (M.D.N.C. 1976).
In Dwoskin v. Rollins, 634 F.2d 285 (5th Cir. 1981), the presumption of reliance was
effectively rebutted in a case involving conversion rights of preferred stock into common stock
because plaintiffs evidence showed that the decision to convert the stock, rather than to take
the cash redemption price, would not have changed even if the defendant had disclosed the
omitted facts, i e., that the common stock might be restricted. Id at 292.
sumption can be rebutted by showing that, taking into consideration
the information available, the investor had knowledge or should
have had knowledge of the omitted information."
B. Fraud on the Market Cases
Courts have not restricted the utilization of presumptions of re-
liance solely to situations in which investors allege nondisclosure.
For instance, when plaintiffs claim that misrepresentations distorted
the price of a security traded in the open market, reliance on those
misrepresentations will be presumed. 0 Federal courts have labeled
this viewpoint the fraud on the market theory. This theory has been
considered an extension of the presumption of reliance provided in
nondisclosure cases to misrepresentation cases involving market
transactions.5
The fraud on the market theory recognizes that certain elements
associated exclusively with the open market 52 may provide the basis
for plaintiff's decision to purchase. An individual may decide to
purchase securities because of a favorable price trend, price earnings
ratio, or some other consideration." Plaintiffs in these situations
rely generally "on the supposition that the market price is validly set
and that no unsuspected manipulation has artificially inflated the
price.
' 54
The central assumption of the fraud on the market approach is
that the market transmits information to investors. 55 This assump-
tion finds support in the efficient market theory, which proposes that
all available, relevant information concerning a specific company
49. Hartnett v. Ryan Homes, Inc., 360 F. Supp. 878, 886 (W.D. Pa. 1973), ard, 496 F.2d
832 (3d Cir. 1974) (court of appeals ruled against plaintiff based on its finding that the omis-
sions were not material).
50. See, e.g., Ross v. A.H. Robins Co., Inc., 607 F.2d 545, 553 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
446 U.S. 946 (1980); Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 906 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied 429
U.S. 816 (1976); Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 507 F.2d 374, 381 (2d Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 421 U.S. 976 (1975); Koenig v. Smith, 88 F.R.D. 604, 607 (E.D.N.Y. 1980); In re LTV
Securities Litigation, 88 F.R.D. 134, 142 (N.D. Tex. 1980); Panzirer v. Wolf, [1979-1980 Trans-
fer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,363 (S.D.N.Y. April 21, 1980).
51. In re LTV Securities Litigation, 88 F.R.D. 134, 142 (N.D. Tex. 1980).
52. Open market transactions in securities differ from initial distributions. Open market
transactions occur when the stock dealt in has previously been traded. Initial distributions are
not preceded by trading in the offered security but consist of public offerings made on behalf
of the issuer. 3A H. BLOOMENTHAL, SECURITIES AND FEDERAL CORPORATE LAW, § 6.03, at 6-
4 (1978).
53. Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 907 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 816
(1976).
54. Id
55. This transmission of information results from the interposition of the market between
the buyer and the seller. The market performs part of the valuation process usually performed
by the investor in face-to-face transactions. "The market is acting as the unpaid agent of the
investor, informing him that given all the information available to it, the value of the stock is
worth the market price." In re LTV Securities Litigation, 88 F.R.D. 134, 143 (N.D. Tex. 1980).
will be reflected in the price of securities traded in the open market.5 6
The theory encompasses "widely followed securities of larger corpo-
rations"'" existing in a "free and actively traded market."58  Thus, in
cases involving misrepresentations of actively traded securities, espe-
cially those of large corporations, reliance on the market's integrity is
a viable concept because the misrepresentations will be reflected in
the price.59 Arguably, no similar result obtains in an initial offering
situation because no basis exists for believing that the market has
established a price that reflects all available, relevant information. 60
Typically, fraud on the market actions are brought as class ac-
tions. To defeat class certification, defendants frequently argue that
proof of reliance will vary among the proposed members of the
class,61 thereby violating the requirements for class certification pro-
cedure.62  Courts have extended the presumption of reliance origi-
nally utilized in nondisclosure cases to class action petitions, in order
to obviate the necessity of denying class certification. This extension
results whether the alleged violation constitutes a nondisclosure or a
misrepresentation.63
56. See Seaboard World Airlines, Inc. v. Tiger Int'l, Inc., 600 F.2d 355, 361 (2d Cir.
1979); Comment, Broker Investment Recommendations and the Efficient Capital/Market Hypoth-
esi.r A Proposed Cautionary Legend, 29 STAN. L. REv. 1077, 1089-90 (1970). As stated by one
author:
Basically, efficient capital markets exist when security prices reflect all available pub-
lic information about the economy, about financial markets, and about the specific
company involved. Implied is that market prices of individual securities adjust very
rapidly to new information. As a result, security prices are said to fluctuate about
their "intrinsic" values.
J. VAN HORNE, FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT AND POLICY 45 (4th ed. 1977).
57. In re LTV Securities Litigation, 88 F.R.D. 134, 144 (N.D. Tex. 1980).
58. Seaboard World Airlines, Inc. v. Tiger Int'l, Inc., 600 F.2d 355, 361 (2d Cir. 1979).
59. "The market price of stocks reflects all available public information-and hence nec-
essarily, any material misrepresentations as well." In re LTV Securities Litigation, 88 F.R.D.
134, 144 (N.D. Tex. 1980).
60. Cf. Arthur Young & Co. v. United States District Court, 549 F.2d 686 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977), in which the court noted that the purchaser of an original issue
should be permitted to rely on the integrity of the regulatory process just as the open market
purchaser relies on the integrity of the market. Id at 695.
61. See, e.g., Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 905 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied 429 U.S.
816 (1976); Pellman v. Cinerama, Inc., 89 F.R.D. 386, 387 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Dura-Bilt v. Chase
Manhattan Corp., 89 F.R.D. 87, 93 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
62. Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that, for a case to
proceed as a class action, the "questions of law or fact common to the members of the class
predominate over any questions affecting only individual members. FED. R. Civ. P.
23(b)(3).
63. See, e.g., Ross v. A.H. Robins Co., Inc., 607 F.2d 545 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied 446
U.S. 946 (1980) (misrepresentations to public regarding a company product); Seiffer v. Topsy's
Int'l, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 653 (D. Kan. 1980) (misrepresentations and omissions in a prospectus
for common stock and debentures); Dura-Bilt Corp. v. Chase Manhattan Corp., 89 F.R.D. 87
(S.D.N.Y. 1981) (misrepresentations in a press release); Greenspan v. Brassler, 78 F.R.D. 130
(S.D.N.Y. 1978) (misrepresentations and omissions in financial reports) (class certification de-
nied on other grounds); Sargent v. Genesco, 75 F.R.D. 79 (M.D. Fla. 1977) (misrepresentations
and omissions in prospectus and other financial media); see also, Rosenfeld, The Impact of
Class Actions on Corporate and Securities Laws, 1972 DuKE L.J. 1167 (1972). Mr. Rosenfeld
posits that if the complaint alleges that a misrepresentation inflates the price of stock traded on
Extending the presumption of reliance to class action litigants
alleging a market fraud theory appears logical because the same con-
siderations that support providing the presumption to an investor
under a fraud on the market theory exist in an individual action or in
an investors' class action.64 Moreover, a presumption of reliance in a
class setting ameliorates the problem of costly individual trials on
the reliance issue.65 The mere presence of a class action, however,
should not furnish the basis for permitting a presumption of reliance.
Rather, the basis lies in the fraud on the market claim itself. There-
fore, absent an allegation of market fraud, proof of reliance should
be required in a case involving misrepresentations.
66
As in cases involving nondisclosures, the presumption of reli-
ance in a market fraud case sustains from a showing of materiality.
67
Similarly, defendants in market cases are permitted to rebut the pre-
sumption of reliance. 68  Affording the defendant an opportunity to
rebut follows logically from the proposition that reliance in fraud on
the market cases is not eliminated, but rather is placed where it real-
istically belongs--connecting the purchaser to the market, not to the
specific misrepresentation.69
A defendant can rebut the presumption of reliance in market
fraud cases by two methods. First, proof that the integrity of the
market and the alleged misrepresentations were not material
70 will
defeat the presumption.7' Second, the defendants can effectively re-
but the presumption by proving that the investors relied primarily on
the open market, a class action should be permitted on the theory that everyone paid the same
excessive price whether or not the misstatement was read. Id at 1178-79.
64. See notes 48-63 and accompanying text supra.
65. Ruder and Cross, Limitations on Civil Liability Under Rule 1ob-5, 1972 DUKE L.J.
1125, 1135 (1972).
66. One commentator finds troublesome the suggestion that the presence of a class action
in itself dispenses with the need to prove reliance. Among the reasons offered for this position
is the enhanced possibility that at least some plaintiffs will recover windfall damages since,
unlike the open market context, plaintiffs must ordinarily establish their individual reliance as
part of the prima facie case. Note, The Reliance Requirement in Private Actions Under SEC
Rule 10b-5, supra note 10, at 597.
67. Ross v. A.H. Robins Co., Inc., 607 F.2d 545, 553 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S.
946 (1980); Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 906 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 816
(1976); Seiffer v. Topsy's Int'l, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 653, 666 (D. Kan. 1980); Koenig v. Smith, 88
F.R.D. 604, 607 (E.D.N.Y. 1980).
68. See, e.g., Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 906 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
816 (1976).
69. In re LTV Securities Litigation, 88 F.R.D. 134, 144 (N.D. Tex. 1980).
70. The United States Supreme Court provided a definition of materiality in TSC Indus-
tries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1975) (action brought under § 14(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934). The court noted, "An omitted fact is material if there is a substantial
likelihood that a reasonable investor would consider it important in deciding how to vote." Id
at 449 (emphasis supplied). Cf. Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972), in
which the Court stated that facts are material if a "reasonable investor might have considered
them important" in his decision. Id at 154 (emphasis supplied).
71. Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 906 (9th Cit. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 816
(1976); Panzirer v. Wolf, [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)] 97363
(S.D.N.Y. April 21, 1980), citing Greenspan v. Brassler, 78 F.R.D. 130 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
a source other than the integrity of the market in making the deci-
sion to purchase.72
Panzirer v. Wo/ff" illustrates a successful rebuttal of the pre-
sumption of reliance in a market fraud case. Plaintiff brought on
action under rule lOb-5 alleging that she had relied on materially
misleading statements contained in the company's annual report, or,
alternatively, on the integrity of the market price of the company's
stock in making a purchase of five hundred shares. The court denied
relief, finding that plaintiff had not relied on the market's integrity or
the misrepresentations. Instead, she had relied partially on a discus-
sion with her broker and partially on a newspaper article concerning
the company.74 Thus, defendant successfully rebutted the presump-
tion with proof that plaintiff had relied on a source other than the
integrity of the market.
In sum, the rebuttable presumption of reliance that courts have
adopted under Affiliated Ute nondisclosure cases has evolved to in-
clude misrepresentation cases that affect the price of securities traded
in the open market. This extension results from a recognition that
the market itself can transmit information, including misrepresenta-
tions, upon which investors rely. Frequently, this situation arises in
a class action with reliance presumed once the materiality of the mis-
representation or nondisclosure is established.75
72. Id The Ninth Circuit has stated this second method of disproving reliance in a
slightly different manner, i.e., the defendant can rebut the presumption "by proving that an
individual purchased despite knowledge of the falsity of a representation, or that he would
have, had he known it." Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 906 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 816 (1976).
73. [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)] 97363 (S.D.N.Y. April 21,
1980).
74. Neither the plaintiff nor her broker had read the company's annual report that con-
tained the misrepresentations. Id Moreover, while the broker did read to the plaintiff a por-
tion of a "tear sheet" relating to the general category of the company's business, he did not
read the information concerning the particular company. Thus, the court found that while the
plaintiff had relied in part on a discussion with her broker, the discussion did not concern the
company's financial statements or condition, and the presumption was effectively rebutted. Id
75. Courts have held that proof of reliance is simply not an issue in certain situations. In
Greenfield v. Flying Diamond Oil Corp., [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)J
97942 (S.D.N.Y. March 30, 1981), the court stated that reliance is a "nonissue" with respect
to a forced seller in a "tender offer-short form merger" situation.
Whatever need there may be to show reliance in other situations, we regard it as
unnecessary when no volitional act is required and the result of a forced sale is that
exactly intended by a wrongdoer. Since the complaint alleges that plaintiff, in effect,
has been forced to divest himself of his stock and this is what defendants conspired to
do, reliance by plaintiff on the claimed deception need not be shown. What must be
shown is that there was deception which misled... stockholders and that this was in
fact the cause of plaintiff's claimed injury.
Id (quoting Vine v. Beneficial Finance Co., 374 F.2d 627, 635 (2d Cir. 1967)).
IV. Legislative History and Judicial Interpretation of Section
10(b) and Rule lOb-5
.4. Legislative History
The legislative history of section 10(b) offers little guidance on
the contours of a private action under section 10(b) and rule lOb-5.
The statement most frequently encountered concerning the purposes
of section 10(b) is that of Thomas G. Corcoran, a spokesman for the
drafters of the 1934 Act. Mr. Corcoran remarked that section 10(b)
was broadly intended as a "catch-all clause."76 Courts frequently
cite this statement as grounds for an expansive interpretation of sec-
tion 10(b). 77 Interestingly, amidst the debate concerning section
10(b) and rule lOb-5, Congress has never limited the implied reme-
dies recognized under section 10(b).78
B. Judicial Interpretation
Given the paucity of sufficient legislative statements on the sub-
ject, an analysis of the judicial perception of the policies and pur-
poses behind the securities laws and rule lOb-5 is useful. The United
States Supreme Court has stated that Congress intended the securi-
ties laws and regulations enacted for the purpose of avoiding fraud
to be construed not "technically, and restrictively, but flexibly to ef-
fectuate [their] remedial purposes."7 9 Recently, however, the Court
qualified generalized references to the remedial purposes of the 1934
Act. In refusing to recognize an implied right of action under section
17(a) of the 1934 Act,80 the Court noted that broad references to the
remedial purposes of the securities laws will not justify reading a
76. Mr. Corcoran noted:
Subsection (c) says, 'Thou shalt not devise any other cunning devices.'. .. Of course
subsection (c) is a catch-all clause to prevent manipulative devices. I do not think
there is any objection to that kind of a clause. The Commission should have the
authority to deal with new manipulative devices. [Congress enacted Subsection (c) as
Section 10(b).]
Stock Exchange Regulation: Hearings on HR 7852 and HR 8720 Before the House Committee
on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 73rd Cong. 2d Sess., 115 (1934), reproduced in 8 EL-
LENBERGER AND MAHAR, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 AND THE
SECURITIES EXCHANGE AcT OF 1934, Item 23, at 115 (1973).
77. See I A. BROMBERG & L. LOWENFELS, SECURITIES FRAUD AND COMMODITIES
FRAUD § 2.2(333) (1979).
78. Congress has, however, resisted attempts to give § 10(b) a more expansive reading.
For example, in 1957 and in 1959 the Securities Exchange Commission urged Congress to
amend § 10(b), charging its wording from "in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security" to "in connection with the purchase or sale, or any attempt to purchase or sell, any
security." 103 CONG. REC. 11636 (1957) (emphasis added); SEC Legislatior Hearings on S.
2345 Before a Subcomm of the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 85th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1957); SEC Legislatioi Hearing on S. 1178-82 Before a Subcomrx of the Senate Comm. on
Banking and Currency, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 67-68 (1959). Congress rejected the proposed
change in both instances based on fears that the change would cause extended civil liability.
79. Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151 (1975); Superintendent of
Insurance v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12 (1971).
80. 15 U.S.C. § 78q(a) (1976).
statutory provision more broadly than the language of the statute
and the statutory scheme reasonably permit.8'
The Court has articulated other purposes to be accommodated
in construing the securities laws. These purposes include preserva-
tion of the integrity of the securities markets,82 promotion of a high
standard of business ethics in the securities industry,83 and substitu-
tion of the philosophy of full disclosure for that of caveat emplor.
84
Lower federal courts describe the policies behind the securities laws
either as promoting full disclosure or protecting investors from
fraudulent practices.85
Whether the desired policy behind the securities laws is full dis-
closure or the protection of investors becomes important in attempt-
ing to ascertain the proper parameters of the reliance requirement in
actions brought under rule lOb-5. 86 If the desired policy is full dis-
closure, an expansive reading of the reliance requirement, which
would permit an investor to rely on the integrity of the market in an
initial offering, is unjustified.87 Permitting the investor to rely solely
on the integrity of the market would emasculate the policy of full
disclosure because plaintiffs could recover without any reference to
the disclosure documents. 8  Conversely, if the policy is to protect
81. Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 576 (1979) (citing Securities Ex-
change Commission v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 103, 116 (1978)).
82. Superintendent of Insurance v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12 (1971).
83. Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151 (1975); Securities Ex-
change Comm'n v. Capital Gains Research, 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963).
84. Id
85. See, e.g., Shores v. Sklar, 647 F.2d 462, 470 (5th Cir. 1981) (en banc),petutionfor cert.
filed 50 U.S.L.W. 3474 (U.S. Nov. 2, 1981) (No. 81-839) (protection of investors); O'Brien v.
Continental Illinois Nat'l Bank & Trust of Chicago, 593 F.2d 54, 60 (7th Cir. 1979) (full disclo-
sure); SEC v. International Chem. Dev. Corp., 469 F.2d 20, 26 (10th Cir. 1972) (protection of
investors); Issen v. GSC Enterprises, 508 F. Supp. 1278, 1289 (N.D. II. 1981) (full disclosure);
Rubenstein v. lU. Corp., 506 F. Supp. 311, 315 E.D. Pa. 1980) (full disclosure).
86. The purpose of the securities laws constituted a major point of contention between
the majority and the dissent in Shores v. Sklar, 647 F.2d 462 (5th Cir. 1981) (en banc),petlion
for cert.filed 50 U.S.L.W. 3474 (U.S. Nov. 2, 1981) (No. 81-839). The majority vacated the
summary judgment granted defendant despite plaintiff's lack of reliance on the offering docu-
ments. The majority opinion based its decision upon its perception of the purpose behind the
security laws: the promotion of free and honest securities markets with full disclosure being
only one means to achieving that end. Id at 470. The dissent argued that the security laws
were not intended to create a scheme of investor's insurance or to regulate directly
the underlying merits of various investments... the federal securities laws are based
on the premise that the federal government's role is merely to ensure the free flow of
complete and accurate information within the Nation's securities markets; once full
diclonire is achieved, individual investors are expected to look out for their own
interests.
Id at 482 (emphasis supplied).
87. Statements by the Supreme Court in Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977),
support this conclusion. The Court described the "fundamental purpose" of the 1934 Act as
full disclosure. "[O]nce full and fair disclosure has occurred, the fairness of the terms of the
transaction is at most a tangential concern of the statute." Id at 477-78.
88. This result seems especially evident in a case like Shores v. Sklar, 647 F.2d 462 (5th
Cir. 1981) (en banc),petitonfor certfiled, 50 U.S.L.W. 3474 (U.S. Nov. 2, 1981) (No. 81-839),
in which the Court permitted plaintiff to recover even though he admitted never reading the
offering documents.
investors and the integrity of the market, a more expansive approach
to the reliance requirement is justified to ensure that virtually all
fraudulent activities are brought within the rule's proscription. 9
Courts, however, do not neatly categorize the policies behind
section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 as either the promotion of full disclo-
sure or the protection of investors from fraudulent activities. The
acceptable approach considers the purposes of the securities laws to
be both full disclosure and the protection of investors.' Thus, judi-
cial pronouncements concerning the purposes of the securities laws
provide conflicting guidance on the requisite reliance element in ini-
tial distributions involving misrepresentations. Recent Supreme
Court decisions that restrict liability in actions brought under section
10(b) and rule lOb-5 provide a proper measure of the permissible
scope of the reliance requirement.9'
C. Recent Supreme Court Restrictions on the Scope of Section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5
The Supreme Court began its restrictive construction of rule
lOb-5 in a series of cases beginning in 197592 with Blue Chip Stamps
v. Manor Drug Stores.93 In Blue Chp, plaintiff had been offered a
registered stock distribution pursuant to an antitrust consent decree.
Two years after this offering, plaintiff filed suit alleging that he and
the class of offerees whom he was seeking to represent refrained
from accepting the offer because the prospectus prepared for the is-
sue was materially misleading in its overly pessimistic appraisal of
the company's status and future prospects. The Court refused to al-
low plaintiff to recover.94
In denying recovery, the Court placed its imprimatur on the
buyer-seller requirement, otherwise known as the Birnbaum doc-
trine.95 Under the Birnbaum rule, only persons who have purchased
89. See generally note 79 supra.
90. For example, in Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972), the
Court stated that the purposes of the securities laws were to provide full disclosure and to
provide a high standard of business ethics in the securities industry. Id at 151 (citing Securi-
ties Exchange Comm'n v. Capital Gains Research, 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963)).
91. Professor Bromberg has labeled this viewpoint the "Contraction Era" for lOb-5 and
the other antifraud provisions. 1 A. BROMBERG & L. LOWENFELS, SECURITIES FRAUD AND
COMMODITIES FRAUD § 2.2 (463) (1979). The Contraction Era contrasts with the expansive
and liberal approach toward securities litigation undertaken by the lower federal courts from
1946 to 1975. See Brooks, Rule lOb-5 in the Balance.- An Analysis of the Supreme Court's Policy
Perspective, 32 HASTINGS L.J. 403, 411 (1980).
92. "Post-1974 Supreme Court decisions concerning rule lob-5 private damages actions
leave little doubt that, in the eyes of the Supreme Court, the lower federal courts have been
goring the wrong ox for nearly three decades." Id at 404.
93. 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
94. Id
95. Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1952), first recognized that a
person must be either a purchaser or a seller of the securities in order to bring an action under
g10(b) or rule lob-5.
or sold securities may maintain an action under section 10(b) and
rule 10b-5.96 Since plaintiff was not a purchaser of the securities in
question, but rather alleged that the misleading prospectus deterred
his purchase, the Court barred his recovery. Justice Rehnquist's
opinion found support for this interpretation in the longstanding ac-
ceptance by the lower federal courts of Birnbaum's "reasonable in-
terpretation of the wording of § 10(b),"9 7 as well as in congressional
failure to reject the Birnbaum interpretation as developed. 98
Restrictive attitudes concerning rule 1Ob-5 litigation continued
in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,99 in which investors victimized by a
fraudulent scheme perpetrated by the president of a brokerage firm
instituted an action for damages against an accounting firm that had
been retained to audit the brokerage firm's books. Plaintiffs based
their claim exclusively on the negligence of the accounting firm,
claiming that the accountants' failure to investigate the company's
internal accounting procedure caused the fraud to remain unde-
tected. The issue presented to the court was whether section 10(b)
and rule lOb-5 would support an action for merely negligent
conduct. 1oo
The Court concluded that a private cause of action for damages
cannot be maintained under section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 absent an
allegation of scienter.'l° The Court heavily emphasized the plain
meaning of the words "manipulative," "device," and "contrivance"
in section 10(b),' °2 because the words made "unmistakable a con-
gressional intent to proscribe a type of conduct quite different from
negligence."' 3 Thus, the Court added the requirement of scienter to
plaintiff's prima facie case, further restricting the potential reach of
rule lOb-5 litigation. Recently, the Supreme Court took a similar
position on enforcement proceedings by the SEC. In Aaron v. Secur-
ities Exchange Commission,1° the Court held that scienter is a neces-
sary element in civil actions brought by the SEC to enjoin violations
96. See note 95 supra.
97. 421 U.S. at 733.
98. Id Note, however, that the Court found no specific congressional support for main-
taining the Birnbaum rule, either. Rather, the Court stated: "We are dealing with a private
cause of action which has been judicially found to exist, and which will have to be judicially
delimited one way or another unless and until Congress addresses the question." Id at 749.
99. 425 U.S. 185 (1975).
100. Id at 197.
101. The Court defined "scienter" as "a mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipu-
late, or defraud," specifically leaving open the question whether this standard includes reckless
behavior. Id at 193 n. 12. For a discussion of the various possible interpretations of the term
"scienter" in rule lob-5 actions, see Bucklo, The Supreme Court Attempts to Define Scienter
Under Rule 10b-5." Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 29 STAN. L. REV. 213, 218-27 (1977).
102. The Court utilized Webster's Dictionary to ascertain the plain meanings of the words
"device" and "manipulate." Id at 199.
103. Id
104. 446 U.S. 680 (1980).
of section 17(a)(1) of the Securities Act of 1933,105 section 10(b), and
rule l0b-5.b°
In Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green,10 7 the Court stated that
only manipulative or deceptive practices by the defendant violate
rule 10b-5. The case arose in the context of a Delaware short-form
merger statute. 108 Plaintiffs, the minority stockholders of the subsid-
iary company, alleged that the stock of the subsidiary had been
fraudulently appraised in an effort to freeze out the minority at an
inadequate price. Plaintiffs rejected the appraisal remedy provided
under Delaware law and brought an action under section 10(b) and
rule 10b-5.' °
The Court held that a claim of breach of fiduciary duty must be
supported by allegations of manipulation or deception in order to
violate either section 10(b) or rule lOb-5. l l0 Defendant had effected
the merger without manipulation or deception and had furnished the
minority stockholders with all relevant information concerning the
merger. Thus, the stockholders could choose to accept or reject the
offer on the basis of that information."'I As in Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder 1 2 the Court examined the language of section 10(b) and
found no indication that Congress intended to prohibit conduct
without manipulation or deception." 3 The Court specifically re-
jected the interpretation that the term "fraud" brought all breaches
of fiduciary duty in connection with securities transactions within the
ambit of rule 10b-5.1
4
Finally, the Court recently decided Chiarella v. United States,
which concerned the activities of a "mark up man" 116 for a New
105. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1976).
106. 446 U.S. at 681.
107. 430 U.S. 462 (1976).
108. The Delaware statute permits a parent company owning at least 90% of a subsidiary's
stock to merge with the subsidiary and to make cash payments for the shares of the minority
shareholders. Although the statutory provision does not require advance notice to or consent
of the minority shareholders, they must be notified within ten days of the merger's effective
date. Any minority shareholder dissatisfied with the offering price can petition the Delaware
Court of Chancery for the payment of the fair value of his shares as determined by a court-
appointed appraiser, subject to court review. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 253(a) (1974).
109. 430 U.S. at 466-67.
110. 430 U.S. at 473-74.
111. Id at 474.
112. 425 U.S. 185 (1975).
113. 430 U.S. at 473.
114. The Court stated that use of the term "fraud" to bring all breaches of fiduciary duty
within the proscriptions of rule lOb-5 would, "like the interpretation rejected by the Court in
Ernst & Ernst, 'add a gloss to the operative language of the statute quite different from its
commonly accepted meaning."' Id at 472 (quoting Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at
199).
115. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
116. Plaintiff, as a "mark up man," selected the type fonts and page layouts for five sepa-
rate takeover bids. The names of the target companies to be acquired were concealed, but
plaintiff used his knowledge of securities to ascertain the names. United States v. Chiarella,
588 F.2d 1358, 1363 (2d Cir. 1978).
York financial printer. During the course of his employment, the
printer handled corporate documents announcing five takeover bids,
enabling him to ascertain the names of the target companies before
the final printing. Based on this knowledge, he purchased target
company stock for his own account without disclosing to the sellers
the information he had acquired through his employment. The
printer sold the shares immediately after the takeover bids were an-
nounced publicly and realized a substantial profit." 7 The Second
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the printer's conviction on seven-
teen counts of violating section 10(b) and rule 10b-5." 8
The Supreme Court reversed. The Court initially noted that the
printer's use of the information would not constitute a fraud under
section 10(b) unless he had an affirmative duty to disclose," 9 thus
rejecting the view that anyone who regularly receives material non-
public information must disclose the information or refrain from
trading. 20 No duty existed because the printer had not been a party
to any prior dealings with the sellers. 2 ' A duty to disclose under the
antifraud provisions of the securities laws did not arise from mere
possession of nonpublic information or from one's position as a mar-
ket insider; rather, that duty arose from a relationship of "trust and
confidence" between the parties to a securities transaction.
22
Once again, the Court examined the language and history of
section 10(b) and found no basis for expanding the concept of duty
to include situations in which a relationship of trust and confidence
did not bind the parties.'23 Failure by Congress and the SEC to
adopt a "parity of information rule" 24 supported the court's conclu-
117. In the course of fourteen months, the printer realized a gain of more than $30,000.
445 U.S. at 224.
118. 588 F.2d 1358 (2d Cir. 1978). This was the first criminal proceeding in which a court
imposed criminal liability on a purchaser for a § 10(b) nondisclosure. For an analysis of
Chiarella, see Cann, A Duty to Disclose? An Analsis of Chiarella v. United Stales, 85 DICK. L.
REV. 249 (1981).
119. 445 U.S. at 231, "When an allegation of fraud is based upon nondisclosure, there can
be no fraud absent a duty to speak." Id at 235.
120. Cann, note 118, at 253.
121. Justice Powell stated:
No duty could arise from petitioner's relationship with the sellers of the target com-
pany's securities, for petitioner had no prior dealings with them. He was not their
agent, he was not a fiduciary, he was not a person in whom the sellers had placed
their trust and confidence. He was, in fact, a complete stranger who dealt with the
sellers only through impersonal market transactions.
445 U.S. at 232-33.
122. The Court noted that affirmance of petitioner's conviction would result in a general
duty in the field of securities to forego any action based on material, nonpublic information.
The Court wanted to see explicit congressional intent before formulating such a broad duty.
Id at 233. Normally, in a business transaction, one party is under a duty to disclose to the
other "matters known to him that the other is entitled to know because of a fiduciary or other
similar relation of trust and confidence between them. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 551(2)(a) (1976).
123. 445 U.S. at 233.
124. Id The SEC has, however, adopted a new rule in response to the Chiarela decision.
sion that the 1934 Act could not be read "more broadly than its lan-
guage and the statutory scheme reasonably permit."
1 25
These cases aptly illustrate the attitude of the Supreme Court on
the permissible scope of rule lOb-5 litigation. Absent express con-
gressional support, a case will be dismissed on the pleadings if plain-
tiff attempts to expand liability under rule lOb-5. 26 This restrictive
interpretation buttresses the conclusion that any attempt to extend
the parameters of recovery under rule lOb-5 should be pursued with
caution.
The Supreme Court's restrictive attitude is also evident in the
Court's disenchantment with implied rights of action in other areas
of securities law. A series of recent Supreme Court cases proceeded
beyond questioning the scope of various implied remedies to ques-
tioning the very existence of these remedies.1 27 Cort v. Ash, 128 in
which the Court attempted to "assemble sixty years of case law relat-
ing to the implication of private remedies into a harmonious
whole,"1 29 is the pivotal case in the area of implied rights of action.
The Cort opinion established a four-part test for determining when a
private remedy should be recognized under any statute that does not
explicitly grant a private remedy.
130
In two securities cases following Cort, the Supreme Court re-
fused to recognize a private cause of action in favor of aggrieved
investors. 3 1 First, in Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 132 the Court
The rule establishes a "disclose or abstain from trading requirement" specifically relating to
material, nonpublic information obtained during the course of a tender offer. The rule re-
quires that if any person has commenced, or taken substantial steps to commence a tender
offer, then any other person who has acquired material nonpublic information from the offeror
shall disclose the information to the public prior to dealing or refrain from trading in the
securities. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e - 3(a) (1981).
125. 445 U.S. at 234 (quoting Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 578 (1979)).
The Court previously utilized this identical language in restricting the reach of remedies under
the securities laws. See, e.g., Aaron v. Securities Exchange Commission, 446 U.S. 680, 695
(1980).
126. See Brooks, supra note 91, at 422-23.
127. See, e.g., Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979); Touche
Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979); Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
128. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
129. Frankel, Implied Rights ofAction, 67 VA. L. REV. 553, 559 (1981).
130. The Cort test is stated as follows:
In determining whether a private remedy is implicit in a statute not expressly provid-
ing one, several factors are relevant, First, is the plaintiff "one of the class for whose
especial benefit the statute was enacted"--that is, does the statute create a federal
right in favor of the plaintiff? Second, is there any indication of a legislative intent,
explicit or implicit, either to create such a remedy or to deny one? Third, is it consis-
tent with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme to imply such a remedy
for the plaintiff? And finally, is the cause of action one traditionally relegated to state
law, in an area basically the concern of the States, so that it would be inappropriate
to infer a cause of action based solely on federal law?
422 U.S. at 78 (emphasis supplied by the Court) (citations omitted).
131. See notes 132-38 and accompanying text infra.
132. 442 U.S. 560 (1979).
denied an implied remedy under section 17(a) of the 1934 Act. 133
Resisting appeals made to the remedial purposes of the Act, the
Court based its decision on congressional failure to create a private
remedy either expressly or by implication. 3 4  Similarly, in Tran-
samerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 31 the Court refused a pri-
vate remedy to an investor under section 206 of the Investment
Advisers Act of 1940,136 a statutory provision closely resembling rule
lOb-5.' 37 As in Touche Ross, the Court's analysis began and ended
with the question whether Congress intended to confer a private
remedy. The Court found that Congress did not so intend. 13
8
Litigants have since raised the issue whether continued recogni-
tion of an implied right of action under section 10(b) is warranted in
light of the Supreme Court's stance on implied statutory remedies in
other areas of securities law. 139 One author has recognized that pre-
serving the implied private cause of action under section 10(b) con-
flicts with the decisions in Touche Ross and Transamerica because no
congressional intent exists to authorize a private lawsuit under sec-
tion 10(b). t4 The Supreme Court also has expressed dissatisfaction
with the recognition of an implied private remedy under section
10(b), by noting that the decision that recognized a private right of
action under section 10(b) 14 was simply an explicit acquiescence "in
the 25-year-old acceptance by the lower federal courts of an implied
133. 15 U.S.C. § 78q(a) (1976).
134. 442 U.S. at 575-76.
135. 444 U.S. 11 (1979).
136. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (1976).
137. Section 206 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any investment advisor, by use of the mails or any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce, directly or indirectly-
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud any client or prospective
client;
(2) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which operates
as a fraud or deceit upon any client or prospective client;
(4) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which is fraudulent,
deceptive or manipulative ...
Id
138. The Court did not consider the other factors mentioned in the Cori analysis:
It is true that in Cort v. Ash, the Court set forth four factors that it considered 'rele-
vant' in determining whether a private remedy is implicit in a statute not expressly
providing one. But the court did not decide that each of these factors is entitled to
equal weight. The central inquiry remains whether Congress intended to create, ei-
ther expressly or by implication, a private cause of action. Indeed the first three
factors discussed in Cort--the language and focus of the statute, its legislative his-
tory, and its purpose.. .-- are ones traditionally relied upon in determining legisla-
tive intent.
444 U.S. II, at 23-24 (quoting Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. at 575-76). Thus,
congressional intent has become the touchstone for implying private remedies under federal
statutes.
139. Wachovia Bank & Trust v. National Student Mktg., 650 F.2d 342 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
140. Frankel, supra note 129, at 563-64.
141. Superintendent of Ins. v. Banker's Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971).
action under § 10(b)."' 42 Abrogation by the Supreme Court of the
implied remedy currently recognized under section 10(b) and rule
lOb-5 is unlikely. Nonetheless, the Touche Ross and Transamerica
decisions express the Court's dissatisfaction with private damage ac-
tions in the context of securities regulation.'43 Accordingly, this dis-
satisfaction militates against expansion of private actions under
section 10(b).
Thus, neither legislative history nor judicial pronouncements on
the purposes of section 10(b) provide much guidance in establishing
the parameters of the reliance requirement in an initial offering in-
volving misrepresentations. One can argue, however, that current
judicial attitudes on implied statutory remedies indicate that an ex-
pansive approach to the reliance requirement should not be adopted.
These judicial attitudes have prompted some commentators to sug-
gest that plaintiffs explore alternate means of seeking redress in se-
curities litigation'"
V. Policy Considerations
In Blue Chp Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 4 Justice Rehnquist
specifically stated that policy considerations are a proper subject of
inquiry in lOb-5 litigation.'" Difficulty inheres in the policy area,
however, because competing policy considerations often surface dur-
ing lOb-5 litigation. Certain considerations support a unified reli-
ance requirement in all cases, whether the transaction included
misrepresentations or nondisclosures. Other policy considerations
support strict adherence to traditional reliance concepts in the con-
text of misrepresentations in initial distributions.' 7
142. Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. at 577 n.19; Cannon v. University of
Chicago, 441 U.S. 676, 690 n.13 (1979).
143. Frankel, supra note 129, at 563.
144. Some commentators have suggested that plaintiffs pursue litigation alternatives to
rule lOb-5 either under state law or under express federal remedies. At the state level, avail-
able remedies include common law actions such as common law fraud, breach of contract,
conversion, and breach of fiduciary duty. State Blue Sky statutes also provide express reme-
dies. Express federal remedies that provide a viable alternative to rule lOb-5 litigation include:
§ 11 of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77k(c) (1976), § 12(2) of the Securities Act of
1933, 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1976), § 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78r
(1976). For a discussion of these remedies, see, e.g., Brooks, supra note 91, at 423-30.
145. 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
146. Id at 737.
147. The many different suggestions advanced by the commentators on the proper role of
reliance in lOb-5 actions are evidence that policies often compete. See Bucklo, Scienter and
Rule 10b-5, 67 NEv. L. REV. 562, 592 (1972) ("the debate over reliance, while at present unset-
tled, seems likely to conclude with the elimination of that element"); Campbell, Elements of
Recovery Under Rule 10b-5: Scienter, Reliance, and Plaintifs Reasonable Conduct Require-
ment, 26 S. CAR. L. REv. 653, 681-82 (1975) (in a discussion of misrepresentations occurring in
face-to-face transactions, the author proposes that "plaintiff can meet his burden of proof with
respect to subjective reliance and causation-in-fact by a showing of materiality..."); Stoll,
Reliance as an Element in 10b-5 Actions, 53 ORE. L. REv. 169, 171 (1974) (courts should "rec-
ognize that affirmative misrepresentations to individual plaintiffs fall under the same consider-
The function of reliance in lOb-5 litigation underlies any discus-
sion of policy. Reliance establishes causation between the defend-
ant's wrongdoing and the plaintiffs loss.'4" Courts generally hold
that reliance remains an issue in all lOb-5 cases, whether cases of
misrepresentation or nondisclosure, with proof of reliance serving as
a prerequisite to recovery in most misrepresentation cases and lack
of reliance serving as an affirmative defense in nondisclosure
cases.1 49 The causal connection provided by proof of reliance func-
tions "to qualify, as between insiders and outsiders, the doctrine of
caveat emptor-not to establish a scheme of investor's insurance."' 50
In this manner, the "potentially limitless thrust"'' of rule 1Ob-5 is
confined to situations in which causation in fact exists.
Policy arguments can be marshalled in favor of creating a uni-
form presumption of reliance for all lOb-5 actions.'52 The often in-
discernible distinction between misrepresentations and
nondisclosures is one consideration that supports this approach. A
plaintiffs claim, either intentionally or of necessity, often contains
hybrid allegations. As a result, "all actions for securities do not fit
neatly into categories of misrepresentation or nondisclosure."'
' 53
Plaintiffs commonly frame their complaints entirely in terms of non-
disclosure in order to gain the advantages of the Affiliated (le pre-
sumption, 54 thereby avoiding the necessity of proving reliance.'1
5
In one instance, purchasers of a corporation's common stock brought
an action under rule lOb-5 against corporate officers and underwrit-
ers, alleging that untrue statements had.been published in various
financial data.' 56  Defendants contended that the claims were
grounded in terms of active misrepresentation, which required indi-
ations of policy. . . as other lOb-5 cases" and move "subjective reliance from the status of a
requirement of the plaintiff's prima facie case to the status of an affirmative defense."); Com-
ment, supra note 10, at 748-49 ("I ... urge the alignment of the balance of the lOb-5 actions
under the same presumption of causation, thus . . . abandoning the use of reliance as an
operative term."); Note, supra note 10, at 584 ("a presumption applicable to all cases would be
inappropriate"; the author proposes a presumption applicable only to situations of nondisclo-
sure and "fraud effected through an impersonal market.").
148. See, e.g., Dwoskin v. Rollins, Inc., 634 F.2d 285, 291 n.4 (5th Cir. 1981); Vervaecke v.
Chiles, Heider & Co., Inc., 578 F.2d 713, 715 (8th Cir. 1978); Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891,
906 (9th Cir. 1975); 3 A. BROMBERG & L. LOWENFELS, SECURITIES FRAUD & COMMODITIES
FRAUD § 8.7, at 213 (1979).
149. Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean, 640 F.2d 534, 548 (5th Cir. 1981). Traditionally,
plaintiff assumes the burden of proving reliance in fraud actions. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF
THE LAW OF TORTS § 41, at 241 (4th ed. 1971).
150. List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 463 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811
(1965).
151. Dwoskin v. Rollins, Inc., 634 F.2d 285, 291 n.7 (5th Cir. 1981) (quoting Titan Group
Inc. v. Faggen, 513 F.2d 234, 239 (2d Cir.), cert. denied 423 U.S. 840 (1975)).
152. See, e.g., Stoll, supra note 147, at 171; Comment, supra note 10, at 748-49.
153. Sargent v. Genesco, 75 F.R.D. 79, 84 (M.D. Fla. 1977).
154. See notes 37-49 and accompanying text supra.
155. See, e.g., Sharp v. Coopers & Lybrand, 649 F.2d 175 (3d Cir. 1981); Dura-Bilt Corp.
v. Chase Manhattan Corp., 89 F.R.D. 87 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
156. Sargent v. Genesco, 75 F.R.D. 79 (M.D. Fla. 1977) (motion for class certification).
vidual proof of reliance. Plaintiffs contended that nondisclosures
characterized the complaint and that individual proof of reliance
was not necessary. 5 7 The court accepted plaintiffs' position and rea-
soned that since the claims could not be characterized as either mis-
representation or nondisclosure, the remedies of the Securities
Exchange Act should be viewed flexibly to achieve a high standard
of integrity in the securities industry.'58
A similar situation that causes conceptual difficulty arises when
a complaint intentionally alleges both nondisclosure and misrepre-
sentation. The Third Circuit recently recognized this problem in
Sharp v. Coopers & Lybrand 159 The purchaser of a limited partner-
ship interest brought an action on behalf of himself and others
against an accounting firm that prepared an opinion letter regarding
the tax treatment of an investment. On appeal, the accounting firm
argued that the trial court erred by allowing a presumption of reli-
ance on the misrepresentations and nondisclosures in the opinion
letter.16
0
The court initially concluded that the case involved both mis-
representations and nondisclosures, and then noted that strict adher-
ence to the misrepresentation-nondisclosure distinction would
require a dual jury instruction. The jury would have to be instructed
to search for proof of reliance for the misrepresentations and for
proof of nonreliance for the omissions. 6 ' The court found this ap-
proach confusing and unacceptable, but recognized that "a steadfast
rule requiring defendant to refute a presumption of reliance would
be neither equitable nor logical." 62 Accordingly, the appellate court
adopted a flexible approach, holding that cases involving both mis-
representations and nondisclosures require the trial court to analyze
the plaintifi's allegations in light of the likely proof at trial, to deter-
mine the most reasonable placement of the burden of proof.
63
Thus, the burden of proving reliance in the Third Circuit may rest
on either party, depending upon the facts of a particular case.
Cases in which it is difficult to characterize a defendant's action
as either a misrepresentation or a nondisclosure, or cases in which
157. The plaintiffs asserted that the defendants were guilty of "one big omission." Id at
84. The alleged omission was the defendants' failure to include an accurate statement of the
depleted financial condition of the corporation in the prospectus and other financial media that
contained the misrepresentations and omissions. Id
158. The court analogized its position to a fraud on the market claim, but it did not specif-
ically adopt the fraud on the market theory. Arguably, plaintiffs could have utilized this the-
ory since they claimed that the value of the stock had been artificially inflated in an open
market setting. Id at 81.
159. 649 F.2d 175 (3d Cir. 1981).
160. Id at 180.
161. Id at 188.
162. Id See generally Stoll, supra note 147, at 171; Comment, supra note 10, at 748-49.
163. 649 F.2d at 188.
both misrepresentations and nondisclosures constitute the alleged
fraudulent activity support arguments in favor of a uniform treat-
ment of the reliance requirement. This uniform treatment could be
providing plaintiffs a presumption of reliance in all situations, in-
cluding misrepresentations in initial offerings."6 Other policy con-
siderations, however, counsel in favor of requiring plaintiffs to prove
reliance in initial distributions with alleged misrepresentations. 65
In recent cases restricting the reach of rule lOb-5 in securities
litigation, the Supreme Court emphasized policy considerations to
support its decisions, with one major concern being settlement
value. 66 Specifically, the Court noted that even a complaint with
little objective chance of success at trial has settlement value to the
plaintiff provided the plaintiff can prevent dismissal or summary
judgment. 67  The very "pendency of the lawsuit may frustrate or
delay normal business activity of the defendant,"' 68 causing the de-
fendant to accept a settlement offer even when the plaintiffs case
lacks merit. 169 Thus, the defendant often chooses to reach an agree-
ment with the plaintiff rather than assume the risk of an adverse
judgment or incur the costs of preparation for litigation. 7 °
Furthermore, in discussing an implied right of action under rule
lOb-5, one commentator noted that costs created by the enforcement
of private liability extend beyond the immediate defendant.' 7 ' Judg-
ment costs to a corporation translate into increased capital costs. "In
that event, not only do shareholders sustain a loss, but the productiv-
ity of the firm may decline-at some cost to society.""' 2 Thus, ex-
pansive concepts of private enforcement may hinder investment by
deterring the issuance of securities.' 73
164. Additioinal policy arguments support providing plaintiffs with a presumption of reli-
ance in initial offerings. For example, one commentator suggests that "the in terrorem effect of
deleting reliance may result in fewer misleading statements being made." Campbell, supra
note 147, at 680. Also, it seems appropriate to provide plaintiffs with all means that might
facilitate recovery so as to preclude the chance that the wrongdoer may escape liability after
engaging in fraudulent activity.
165. See notes 166-178 and accompanying text infra.
166. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. at 740.
167. Id
168. Id
169. Judicial concerns regarding "vexatious litigation" exist concomitantly with concerns
for settlement value. See, e.g., Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. at 478-79.
170. For example, one recent study examined specific settlements and judgments in the
context of shareholder derivative and class action lawsuits. The author concluded:
[W]hen stockholders press their cases, their chances of obtaining some measure of
relief are quite good; over 75% of such cases resulted in either settlements, accommo-
dation by the defendants, or a judgment in favor of the plaintiffs. Of these three
modes of termination, settlements accountedfor the Yast majority (94%), accommoda-
tion for 5% and judgments for only 1%.
Jones, An Empirical Examination of the Resolution of Shareholder Derivative and Class Action
Lawsuits, 60 B.U.L. REV. 542, 567 (1980) (emphasis supplied).
171. Frankel, supra note 129, at 577-78.
172. Id
173. Id
Another consideration supporting the viewpoint that plaintiffs
should be required to prove reliance on the particular misrepresenta-
tions in initial offerings is the cost of mandatory corporate disclosure
documents. One recent study conservatively estimated the cost of
SEC new issue disclosures at $193 million for 1975.'7' This high cost
and the concomitant policy that investors be encouraged to examine
disclosure materials illustrate the importance of these documents. In
Shores v. Sklar, M however, the court permitted plaintiff to plead
market fraud despite his admitted lack of reliance on the offering
materials. 76 Permitting a plaintiff to recover based on the integrity
of the market in an initial offering seemingly lessens the importance
of the requirement that issuers furnish investors with disclosure
documents.
Deciding whether plaintiffs alleging misrepresentations in initial
offerings should be required to prove reliance on the misrepresenta-
tions requires balancing competing policy concerns. The occasional
difficulty in distinguishing between misrepresentations and nondis-
closures, the desire to deter misrepresentations, and the policy of
punishing wrongdoers support a more relaxed reliance requirement.
The Fifth Circuit adopted this approach by analogizing an initial
offering situation to the fraud on the market theory developed in the
context of securities traded in the open market. 177 Other considera-
tions, however, mandate adherence to the requirement that plaintiff
prove reliance on the alleged misrepresentations. These considera-
tions include the need to establish causation between the defendant's
act and the plaintiff's injury, the adverse effects of settlement value




The reliance requirement in securities litigation has evolved to
accommodate plaintiffs in circumstances in which the reliance re-
quirement previously would have barred their recovery. When the
defendant has simply failed to disclose or when misrepresentations
have affected the price of stock traded in the open market, courts do
not and should not require plaintiffs to prove reliance on the fraudu-
lent activity. Rather, courts provide plaintiffs with a presumption of
reliance.
The reasons supporting this presumption fail, however, if the
174. S. PHILLIPS & P. ZECHER, THE SEC AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 51 (1981).
175. 647 F.2d 462 (5th Cir. 1981) (en banc),pelftionfor cert.filed, 50 U.S.L.W. 3474 (U.S.
Nov. 2, 1981) (No. 81-839).
176. Id at 468.
177. Id at 468-69.
178. See note 146 supra.
alleged misrepresentations occur in initial distributions. In these sit-
uations plaintiffs face no unreasonable evidentiary burden in prov-
ing reliance. Moreover, plaintiffs should not be permitted to rely on
the integrity of the market since no basis exists for assuming that the
market has set an accurate price reflecting all information. There-
fore, plaintiffs bringing actions under section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 in
initial offerings should be required to prove reliance on the misrepre-
sentations. The Supreme Court's current restrictive attitude toward
section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 litigation, as well as its position on im-
plied rights of action, especially compel this result.
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